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本文尝试基于双边市场理论构建差异化共享平台之间的博弈模型,厘清交叉网络外部性、自竞争网络外部性强度的差异影响平台定价水平的逻辑,分析不同价格竞争策略下的平台利润水平和社会福利水平。研究发现:①平台先定价时的价格水平总是最高。小规模平台先定价时的市场竞争程度最为激烈,市场同时定价时的竞争程度适中,大规模平台先定价时的市场竞争程度最为缓和。②若自竞争网络外部性强度差异保持不变,当交叉网络外部性强度差异较大时,大规模平台的利润水平高于小规模平台;反之,则大规模平台的利润水平低于小规模平台。③无论是大规模平台还是小规模平台,同时定价时获得的利润水平最低;后定价时获得的利润水平最高。④两个平台同时定价时的社会福利水平最高。研究结论能够为共享平台的高效运作提供管理启示。

To clarify how the logic of cross-network externality parameters' difference and self-competitive network externality parameters' difference affect platform pricing level, analyse platforms' profit level and social welfare level under different price competition strategies, we construct the game model between differentiated sharing platforms based on the two-sided market theory. The research finds that the price level of platforms is the highest when platform prices firstly, the market competition is the intenses when smaller platform prices firstly, the competition is moderate when two platforms price simultaneously, and the competition is the most moderate when bigger platform prices firstly. If the differences of self-competitive network externality parameters stay the same, the profits of large-scale platforms will be higher than that of small-scale platforms when the cross-sided network externality parameter is bigger. On the contrary, the profit of large-scale platforms is lower than that of small-scale platform. Whether it is a large-scale platform or a small-scale platform, the lowest profit level is obtained when they prices simultaneously, and the highest profit level is obtained when they prices firstly. The highest level of social welfare is achieved when the two platforms prices simultaneously. The conclusions of the study can provide management implications for the efficient operation of the sharing platforms.